How Christian Denominations Differ
Introduction
In his great encyclical Evangelium
vitae Pope John Paul II discusses the relationship between contraception
and abortion. To the common claim that contraception, “if made available to
all, is the most effective remedy against abortion,” the Holy Father replied:
When
looked at carefully, this objection is clearly unfounded. It may be that many
people use contraception with a view to excluding the subsequent temptation to
abortion. But the negative values inherent in the “contraceptive mentality”…are
such that they in fact strengthen this temptation when an unwanted life is
conceived…. Certainly, from the moral point of view contraception and abortion
are specifically different evils: the former contradicts the full truth
of the sexual act as the proper expression of conjugal love, while the latter destroys
the life of a human being; the former is opposed to the virtue of chastity in
marriage, the latter is opposed to the virtue of justice and directly violates
the divine commandment, “You shall not kill” (no. 13.2).
Note
that here the Pope does not directly identify contraception as an anti-life
kind of act. He characterizes it as an anti-love kind of act, one that,
as he says elsewhere, “falsifies” the meaning of the conjugal act as one in
which the spouses freely “give” themselves unreservedly to one another. [1] In addition, he specifies that
contraception is a violation of marital chastity and thus opposed to the sixth
commandment, whereas abortion is opposed to justice and violates the fifth
commandment. [2] Nonetheless, he
insists that despite their differences “contraception and abortion are very
closely connected, as fruits of the same tree” (Evangelium vitae, no.
13); and, as he has pointed out in some of his addresses and homilies,
contraception too is opposed to the good of human life. [3]
In pointing out the anti-life character
of contraception John Paul II is recalling a long tradition in the Church.
There is, in fact, a long and respected Christian tradition, common to both the
East and the West and, indeed, to Catholics and Protestants until this
tradition was broken by the Church of England at the Lambeth Conference in
1930, comparing contraception to homicide. After citing representative texts
from that long tradition, I will then relate the anti-life character of
contraception to one of the major roots of the culture of death identified by
John Paul II in Evangelium vitae and to his claim, in Familiaris
consortio, no. 32. 6, that the “difference, both anthropological and
moral, between contraception and recourse to the rhythm of the cycle…is much
wider a deeper than is usually thought, one which involves in the final
analysis two irreconcilable concepts of the human person and of human
sexuality.”
The
Christian Tradition and the Anti-Life Character of Contraception
Passages from St. John Chrysostom, St. Thomas Aquinas, the Si
Aliquis canon (part of the Church’s canon law from the mid-thirteenth
century until 1917), The Roman Catechism, and the Reformer, John Calvin,
illustrate the long Christian tradition stressing contraception’s character as
an anti-life kind of act.
St. John
Chrysostom
This great Father of the Eastern Church
spoke in no uncertain terms about the homicidal nature of contraception,
writing, for instance, as follows:
Why do you sow where the field is
eager to destroy the fruit? Where there are medicines of sterility? Where there
is murder before birth? You do not even let a harlot remain only a harlot but
you make her a murderess as well. Do you not see that from drunkenness comes fornication,
from fornication adultery, from adultery murder? Indeed, it is something worse
than murder and I do not know what to call it; for she does not kill what is
formed but prevents its formation. What then? Do you contemn the gift of God,
and fight with his law?
…Do you make the anteroom of birth
the anteroom of slaughter? Do you teach the woman who is given to you for the
procreation of offspring to perpetuate killing? [4]
St. Thomas Aquinas
Referring to contraception, the Angelic
Doctor declared:
Nor, in fact, should it be
considered a slight sin for a man to arrange for the emission of semen apart
from the proper purpose of begetting and bringing up children….the inordinate
emission of semen is incompatible with the natural good of preserving the species.
Hence, after the sin of homicide whereby a human life already in existence is
destroyed, this type of sin appears to take next place, for by it the
generation of human nature is impeded. [5]
The “Si Aliquis” Canon
This canon, integrated into the law of
the Church in the Decretum Gregorii IX (book 5, title 12, chapter 5) and
part of the Church’s canon law from the mid-thirteenth century until the 1917 Code
of Canon Law, clearly compared contraception to murder. It declared:
If anyone (Si aliquis) for the
sake of fulfilling sexual desire or with premeditated hatred does something to
a man or a woman, or gives something to drink, so that he cannot generate or
she cannot conceive or offspring be born, let him be held as a murderer. [6]
The Roman Catechism (Catechism of the
Council of Trent)
In
its treatment of marriage, this Catechism, used universally in the
Church from the end of the sixteenth century until the late twentieth century,
had this to say about contraception: “Whoever in marriage artificially prevents
conception, or procures an abortion, commits a most serious sin: the sin of
premeditated murder.” [7] We
ought to note that Pope Paul VI explicitly referred to this text in footnote
number 16 appended to Humanae vitae, no. 14.
And finally, we have the testimony of
one of the leading figures of the Protestant Reformation.
John Calvin
Calvin, in his commentary on the sin of
Onan (Gen 38), wrote as follows, in language reminiscent in part of that used
by St. Thomas Aquinas in the passage already cited:
Onan not only defrauded his brother
of the right due him, but also preferred his semen to putrefy on the
ground….The voluntary spilling of semen outside of intercourse between a man
and a woman is a monstrous thing. Deliberately to withdraw from coitus in
order that semen may fall on the ground is doubly monstrous. For this is to extinguish
the hope of the race and to kill before is born the hoped-for offspring….If any
woman ejects a foetus from her womb by drugs, it is reckoned a crime incapable
of expiation, and deservedly Onan incurred upon himself the same kind of
punishment, infecting the earth by his semen in order that Tamar might not
conceive a future human being as an inhabitant of the earth. [8]
These texts should suffice to show that
a long Christian tradition regarded contraception as an anti-life kind of act, comparable to homicide
and intentional abortion. This tradition was retrieved and developed at length
in a 1988 essay by Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, and myself. [9] The argument developed by us is well
summarized by Alicia Mosier in an article in First
Things. Commenting on Pope Paul’s description
of contraception in Humanae vitae, no.
14, where he identifies as immoral every action that proposes to impede
procreation, she wrote:
Proposing
to render procreation impossible means, simply put, willing directly against
the order of intercourse and consequently against life….Couples who contracept
introduce a countermeasure…whose sole purpose is to make it impossible for a
new life to come to be. Contraception is an act that can only express the will
that any
baby that might result from this sexual encounter not be conceived….it manifests a will
aimed directly against new life. [10]
Since contraception is an anti-life
kind of an act, in addition to being an anti-love kind of an act (as
John Paul II has emphasized), it is clearly linked to the “culture of death.”
That it is indeed the “gateway” to this culture will becomes evident if we can
show the close bond between contraception and one of the “roots” of this
culture identified by John Paul II.
John Paul II on the Roots of the
Culture of Death
In the first chapter of Evangelium
vitae Pope John Paul II identifies two roots of the culture of death. This
culture, he says, is rooted first of all in the “mentality which carries the
concept of subjectivity to an extreme
and even distorts it, and recognizes as a subject of rights only the person who
enjoys full or at least incipient autonomy and who emerges from a state of
total dependence on others” (no. 19). It is rooted, secondly, in a “notion
of freedom which exalts the isolated individual
in an absolute way” (ibid).
Of these two roots the first is most
relevant for showing the relationship of contraception to the culture of death.
At its heart is the idea that only those members of the human species who enjoy
full or at least “incipient autonomy,” i.e., individuals with exercisable
capacities for reasoning and will, are truly persons with rights that ought to
be recognized by society. This mentality, the Holy Father points out, “tends to
equate personal dignity with the capacity for verbal and explicit,
or at least perceptible, communication” (ibid). On this view a “person”
is preeminently a subject aware of itself as a self and capable of relating to
other selves; and not all members of the human species are persons on this
understanding of “person.” This view or anthropology is clearly dualistic,
because it distinguishes sharply between “conscious subjects” or “persons” and
their bodies and bodily life. One can be biologically a living human body and
not be a “person.” Members of the human species who are merely “biologically
alive” easily become expendable.
I will now show that this anthropology
or way of understanding the human “person” (and, in association with it, human
sexuality) is central to the practice of contraception and has led the way to
the acceptance of abortion, euthanasia, the laboratory manufacturing of human
life for experimental purposes. I will then show that the approach to making
moral judgments or moral methodology used to justify contraception has
also led to the acceptance of these practices, the hallmarks of the “culture of
death.” John Paul II himself, I believe, was acutely aware of this when he made
a very bold claim in one of his earliest apostolic exhortations, Familiaris
consortio. I have already cited a portion of this highly important text.
The passage in question reads as follows:
In
the light of the experience of many couples and the data provided by the
different human sciences, theological reflection is able to perceive and is
called to study further the difference, both anthropological
and moral,
between contraception and recourse to the rhythm of the cycle: it is a
difference much wider and deeper than is usually thought, one which involves in
the final analysis two irreconcilable concepts of the
human person and of human sexuality (no. 32.6).
The Anthropology at the Heart of Contraception
A dualistic understanding of the human
person and of human sexuality is at the heart of the defense of contraception.
This anthropology regards the body—and bodily life—as merely an instrumental
good, a good for the person, and not
a good intrinsic to the person, a good of
the person. In this anthropology the body and bodily life are good insofar as
they are necessary conditions for experiencing truly personal goods or goods of
the person. However, if participating in these truly personal goods is not
possible, or if the continued flourishing of merely bodily goods (e.g.,
fertility) inhibits participation in them, then the usefulness of the body,
bodily functions, and even of bodily life itself vanishes, and one can attack
the body, bodily functions, and even bodily life itself without violating the person.
Indeed, respect for the person may
require one to do so.
This
anthropology, as shall now be shown, underlies key arguments advanced to
support contraception. I will begin with representative passages from the
documents of the so-called “majority papers of the Papal Commission on
Population, the Family, and Natality, [11]and
continue with statements by leading champions of contraception to support this
claim.
A key idea in the defense of
contraception is that human dominion over physical nature, willed by God,
justifies the use of contraceptives to prevent unwanted pregnancies. Thus the
authors of the Majority papers noted that, “in the matter at hand,” namely
contraception,
[T]here is a certain change in the
mind of contemporary man. He feels that he is more conformed to his rational
nature, created by God with liberty and responsibility, when he uses his skill
to intervene in the biological processes of nature so that he can achieve the
ends of matrimony in the conditions of actual life, than if he would abandon
himself to chance. [12]
In
another passage the majority declared, “it is proper to man, created in the
image of God, to use what is given in physical nature in a way that he may
develop it to its full significance with a view to the good of the whole
person.” [13]
These
passages make it clear that defenders of contraception consider the biological
fertility of human persons and the biological processes involved in the
generation of new human life as physical or biological “givens.” Human
fertility, in other words, is part of the subhuman or subhuman world of
“nature” over which persons have been given dominion. Indeed, according to the
majority theologians of the Commission “biological fertility…ought to be
assumed into the human sphere and be regulated within it.” [14]Obviously, if the biological fecundity of
human persons is intrinsically
human, it does not need “to be assumed into the human sphere.” Nothing assumes
what it already is or has itself. The claim made is clearly dualistic.
This dualistic understanding of the
human person, which makes the human body merely an instrumental good and not a personal
good
is even more luminously exemplified in the following passage from the
dissenting theologian Daniel Maguire: “Birth control [contraception] was, for a
very long time, impeded by the physicalistic ethic that left moral man at the
mercy of his biology. He had no choice but to conform to the rhythms of his
physical nature and to accept its determinations obediently. Only gradually did
technological man discover that he was morally free to intervene creatively and
to achieve birth control by choice.” [15] It
is worth noting that in this essay, an apologia for euthanasia, Maguire
immediately goes on to ask, rhetorically: “The question now arising is whether,
in certain circumstances, we may intervene creatively to achieve death by
choice or whether mortal man must in all cases await the good pleasure of
biochemical and organic factors and allow these to determine the time and
manner of his demise….Could there be circumstances when it would be acutely
reasonable (and therefore moral…) to terminate life through either positive
action or calculated benign neglect rather than await in awe the dispositions
of organic tissue?” [16]
The
notion that human biological fertility is, of itself, subpersonal and subhuman
is closely related to the understanding of human sexuality central to the
defense of contraception. One of the major reasons for changing the Church’s
teaching on contraception, so the theologians of the majority party maintained,
was the “changed estimation of the value and meaning of human sexuality,” one
leading to a “better, deeper, and more correct understanding of conjugal life
and the conjugal act.” [17]According
to this understanding, human
sexuality, as distinct from animal sexuality, is above all relational or
unitive in meaning. As a leading champion of contraception and opponent of the
teaching of Humanae vitae put matters, “the most profound meaning of human sexuality
is that it is a relational reality, having a special significance for the
person in his relationships.” [18] Human
sexuality, as other defenders of contraception contend, “is preeminently…the
mode whereby an isolated subjectivity [=person] reaches out to communion with
another subject…in order to banish loneliness and to experience the fullness of
being-with-another in the human project.” [19]
Proponents
of this understanding of human sexuality grant that human sexual union can be
procreative—or to use a term that the more secularistic of them
prefer—“reproductive.” Human sexuality does serve “biological” needs such as
the reproduction of the species. But in doing so human sexuality is in no way
different from generic animal sexuality. This aspect of sexuality, common to
humans, dogs, cats, baboons and other animals, is simply part of the world of
subhuman, subpersonal nature under the dominion of the person or conscious
subject. The generative or reproductive aspect of human sexuality is, of
course, necessary for the continuation of the species (although today there are
perhaps better ways of generating life through the new reproductive
technologies). Yet in addition to these merely “biological” needs, sexual
union serves other, more “personal” values, those dependent on being
consciously experienced—e.g., the tenderness, affection, and pleasure of “lovers.”
Moreover, the fact that human genital sex results in the conception of new
human life has, in the past and even today, frequently inhibited the
realization of these more personal and valuable purposes. But now—and this is the
key consideration—it is possible to use efficient methods of contraception to
sever the connection between the “procreative” or “reproductive” aspect of
sexuality and its more personal “relational” or “unitive” aspect—and this is a
great good.
It is surely true that many people in the
Western (and increasingly in the non-Western) world regard the emergence of
efficient contraceptives as a truly liberating event. Many would agree with the
late British anthropologist, Ashley Montagu, who wrote:
The
pill provides a dependable means of controlling conception….[T]he pill makes it
possible to render every individual of reproductive age completely responsible
for both his sexual and his reproductive behavior. It is necessary to be
unequivocally clear concerning the distinction between sexual behavior and
reproductive behavior.
Sexual behavior may have no purpose other than pleasure…without the slightest
intent of reproducing, or it may be indulged in for both pleasure and
reproduction. [20]
The majority theologians of the Papal
Commission would not go so far as Montagu and other secular champions of
contraception and sever totally the bond between the
procreative and unitive meanings of human sexuality. Nonetheless, with him they
regard the “relational” or “unitive” meaning of sexuality its “personal”
significance, while considering its “procreative” meaning in and of itself
“subhuman” or “subpersonal,” in need of being “assumed into the human.”
Coupling this understanding of human sexuality with the dominion that human
persons have over the subhuman world of nature, which includes their biological
fertility, they contend that if the continued flourishing of biological
fecundity inhibits the expression of the relational or unitive meaning of
sexuality, then it is perfectly permissible to suppress this “biological given”
so that the truly personal values of human sexuality can be realized.
The material reviewed here clearly
shows, I believe, the dualistic anthropology and understanding of the human
person and of human sexuality underlying the justification of contraception.
This anthropology identifies the person
with the consciously experiencing subject or, as John Paul II noted in Evangelium
vitae, no. 19, the subject having “the capacity for verbal and explicit, or
at least perceptible, communication,” and this anthropology regards the body
as an instrument that the person or conscious subject uses, now for this
purpose, now for that. It likewise regards as intrinsically “personal” and
“human” only the “relational,” “amative,” or “unitive” aspect of human
sexuality, considering its “procreative/reproductive” aspect merely biological
in itself and in need of being “assumed” into the “human” by being consciously
chosen and willed if it is to become personal.
And this anthropology is central to the
“culture of death.” If the person is not
his or her own body, then, as Germain
Grisez has perceptively noted, “the destruction of the body is not directly and
in itself an attack on a value intrinsic to the human person.” Continuing, he
said:
The lives of the unborn, the lives
of those not fully in possession of themselves—the hopelessly insane and the
“vegetating” senile—and the lives of those who no longer can engage in praxis
or problem solving, become lives no longer meaningful, no longer valuable, no
longer inviolable. [21]
This dualistic anthropology, at the
heart of the justification and practice of contraception, has led to the
justification of abortion on the grounds that the life thus taken, while
“biologically human,” is not “meaningfully human” or “personal life,” to the
justification of euthanasia on the grounds that it serves the needs of the
“person” when that person’s biological life becomes a burden, and to the
“production” of human embryos, identifiable biologically as living members of
the human species, as experimental objects on the grounds that they can not be
considered as persons because they do not exercisable cognitive abilities.
The Moral Methodology Underlying the
Acceptance of Contraception
It will be recalled that in the passage
from Familiaris consortio cited earlier Pope John Paul noted that the
difference between contraception and recourse to the rhythm of the cycle was moral
as well as anthropological. We have examined the anthropology
underlying the acceptance of contraception. But what is its moral
approach or method, its way of justifying human actions? And how does this
method relate to the “culture of death”?
An indication of this moral methodology
is provided by the following passage from “The Question Is Not Closed,” one of
the documents of the majority members of the Papal Commission:
To
take his or another’s life is a sin not because life is under the exclusive
dominion of God, but because it is contrary to right reason unless there is
question of a good of a higher order. It is licit to sacrifice a life for the good of the
community. [22]
I call attention to this passage
because the principle set forth in it, namely, that one can destroy human life
(or other human goods) provided that one does so for the sake of an alleged
higher or greater good, is a key principle of the moral theory behind the
acceptance of contraception and the justification for the intentional killing of
innocent human persons if necessary to achieve a greater good. I call this the
“Caiaphas principle,” although today it is more commonly referred to as the
“preference principle” or “principle of proportionate good,” according to which
one can rightly do so-called “pre-moral” evil for the sake of a proportionately
higher “premoral” good. This principle then serves as an “exception-making”
clause to every specific negative moral norm. Thus, “one ought not to have sex
outside of marriage,” or “one ought not intentionally kill innocent human
beings,” etc. unless doing so is necessary to achieve some prorportionately
related “greater good” or to avoid some “greater evil.”
The
moral method of proportionalism, used originally by Catholic theologians to
justify contraception, soon led, as one of its advocates, Charles Curran
frankly admitted, [23]to the
justification of such deeds as intentional abortion, euthanasia, the
manufacturing of human embryos, homosexual acts engaged in by homosexually
oriented couples in a committed relationship. It was quickly realized that the
“Caiaphas principle” in addition to justifying the doing of a “disvalue” (later
called a “pre-moral evil” or “non-moral evil” in the case of contraception
(namely, deliberately impeding procreation), in principle extended to the doing
of other so-called “premoral evils” (e.g., killing innocent people, having sex
outside of marriage, etc.) for the sake of some proportionately related greater
“pre-moral good,”
Closely allied to the “Caiaphas
principle” or “principle of proportionate good” is another principle at the
heart of the justification of contraception (and, later, other deeds in which
evil is done for some “higher ” good). This is the principle of “totality” as
understood by the advocates of contraception. This principle is illustrated by
the argument, advanced by the majority of the Papal Commission, distinguishing
between individual or “isolated” marital acts and marriage as a “whole” or “totality.”
Its principal claim is that the good of procreation is properly respected and
honored even if individual acts of marriage are deliberately made infertile, so
long as those acts are ordered to an expression of love and to a generous
fecundity within marriage as a whole. An illuminating passage reads as follows:
When man interferes with the
procreative purpose of individual acts by contracepting, he does this with the
intention of regulating and not excluding fertility. Then he unites the
material finality which exists in intercourse with the formal finality of the
person and renders the entire process human…Conjugal acts which by intention
are infertile or which are rendered infertile are ordered to the expression of
the union of love; that love, however, reaches its culmination in fertility
responsibly accepted. For that reason other acts of union are in a certain
sense incomplete; and they receive their full moral quality with ordination
toward the fertile act….Infertile conjugal acts constitute a totality with
fertile acts and have a single moral specification.[24]
Note that this passage considers
“recourse to the rhythm of the cycle” or periodic abstinence as simply another
contraceptive method: it equates “acts which by intention are infertile,” that
is, marital acts chosen while the wife is not fertile, and acts “which are
rendered infertile.” The authors, in short, see no moral difference between contraception
and “recourse to the rhythm of the cycle.” The latter is simply another way of
contracepting. [25] They do so
because they consider the intentions involved to be the same in both cases. The
“intention” common to both is to avoid a pregnancy, perhaps for a good reason.
I will return to this matter below.
The central claim of this passage is that the moral object specifying what
couples who “responsibly” contracept individual acts of marital congress are
doing is “fostering love responsibly toward a generous fecundity.” Their aim,
their “intention” is to nourish simultaneously the procreative and unitive
purposes of their marriage. While it can be granted that this is the further
intention or end for whose sake contraception is chosen, this claim
simply ignores the couple’s present intention, or their choice of
means to achieve this end, this “further intention.”
This claim is rooted in the idea that we can identify the moral object
specifying a human act only by considering the act in its “totality.”
According to this method of making moral decisions, it is not possible to
determine the moral species of an action—whether it is good or bad—without
taking into account the “[further] intention” or end for whose sake one does
what one does along with the foreseeable consequences for the persons
concerned. If one does this, so the argument goes, one can conclude that, if
the choice to contracept individual acts is directed to the end of nourishing
conjugal love so that the good of procreation can also be served, then one can
say that what the spouses are doing—the moral object of their
choice—is to foster conjugal love toward a generous fecundity, obviously
something good, not bad.
This
reasoning is utterly specious. In essence, it re-describes the
contraceptive act, in fact, a whole series of contraceptive acts, in terms of
hoped-for benefits. The remote or further end (which serves as
the “proportionate good”) for whose sake the couple contracepts individual acts
of sexual union may well be, as noted above, to nourish simultaneously the
unitive and procreative goods of marriage. This is the hoped-for end, and
intending it is good. However, the human acts freely chosen to attain this end
must be morally evaluated independently of the hoped-for end. And the human
acts freely chosen for this purpose are acts of contraception, and the couple
has freely chosen to contracept. That is their present intention, as
distinct from the further intention of fostering love responsibly. This
specious moral reasoning simply conceals the fact that the couple are indeed contracepting,
i.e., freely choosing to impede, here and now, in this act of sexual
union, the coming to be of new human life. This is the moral object specifying
their act, and not the future benefits they hope to gain by acting in
this way. There is, moreover, no intrinsic relationship between the
means they choose—contraception—and their hoped-for benefits. Contraception
itself does not foster love or serve procreation; indeed, couples who contracept
may separate, become alienated, and divorce because of contraception and not
foster love responsibly.
The moral methodology used here, in
other words, is consequentialistic or proportionalist. It fails to recognize
that the morality of human acts, as John Paul II has so correctly said in his
encyclical on the moral life, Veritatis splendor, “depends primarily and
fundamentally on the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will” (no.
78). With respect to contraception that object is not “to foster love
responsibly toward a generous fecundity” or to nourish simultaneously the
unitive and procreative goods of marriage. As we saw earlier in this paper, in
choosing to contracept one chooses to do something, prior to, during, or
subsequent to a freely chosen genital act, precisely to impede procreation. [26] One chooses to so
because one reasonably believes that a new human life could come to be through this
chosen act, and one wills that that life not come to be and thus
seeks to impede its coming into being. But this, as we have seen, in an
anti-life kind of act.
The consequentialistic,
proportionalistic methodology justifying contraception and leading, as we have
seen, to the justification of other deeds (the killing of the innocent, sodomy,
etc.) was soundly and rightly repudiated by John Paul II in Veritatis
splendor. A central theme of this methodology, as we have seen, is the
denial of universally true moral norms, allowing no exceptions, prohibiting
intrinsically evil acts. The “central theme” of Veritatis splendor,
to the contrary, was precisely, as John Paul II himself declared, “the reaffirmation
of the universality and immutability of the moral commandments,
particularly those which prohibit always and without exception intrinsically
evil acts” (no. 115).
We have now seen the dualistic
anthropology and proportionalistic or consequentialistic moral methodology
underlying the defense of contraception—and the deadly deeds
characteristic of the culture of death: abortion, euthanasia, the manufacturing
of human embryos, etc.
“Recourse
to the Rhythm of the Cycle” (=Periodic Abstinence) and the Culture of
Life
Contraception, we
have now seen, is the “gateway” to the culture of death . It is so because it
is an anti-life kind of act whose acceptance is rooted in a dualistic
anthropology separating the consciously experiencing subject from his or her
body and in a proportionalistic, consequentialistic moral approach repudiating
the notion of intrinsically evil acts. Utterly opposed to contraception is “recourse
to the rhythm of the cycle,” whose concept of the human person and of human
sexuality is, the Holy Father affirmed, “irreconcilable” with that of
contraception. It thus seems to me that respect for the “rhythm of the
cycle”—which is simply a way of referring to the periodic abstinence required
in natural family planning when there are good reasons not to cause a
pregnancy-- can be regarded as the “gateway” to the culture of life and the
civilization of love precisely because its concept of the human person and of
human sexuality rests upon solid anthropological and moral foundations. I thus
now wish to look briefly at these foundations and at the concept of the human
person and of human sexuality at the heart of the practice of periodic
continence.
The anthropology is holistic, i.e., it regards the human person as a unity of
body and soul. The person is, in the unity of body and soul, the subject of
moral actions. [27] On this
anthropology, the body and bodily life are integral to the person, goods of
the person, not merely goods for the person.
Human persons are, in other words, body persons. When God created Man, “male
and female he created them” (Gen 1:27). The human body expresses the human
person; and since the human body is inescapably either male or female, it
expresses a man-person or a woman-person. Precisely because of their sexual
differences, manifest in their bodies, the man-person and the woman-person can
give themselves to one another bodily. Moreover, since the body, male or
female, is the expression of a human person, a man and a woman, in giving their
bodies to one another, give their persons to one another. The bodily gift of a
man and a woman to each other is the outward sign, the sacrament, of their communion
of persons. The body is the means and the sign of the gift of the
man-person to the female-person. Pope John Paul II calls this capacity of the
body to express the communion of persons the nuptial meaning of the
body. [28]
From
this it follows that every living human body is a person , whether it is
the body of an unborIn child, a severely
demented baby or teen-ager or adult, an “out of” senile person who knows not
that he or she is a consciously experiencing subject. All these living human
bodies, who are considered non-persons in the culture of death, are truly
persons.
In addition, human fertility or
fecundity is not some subhuman, subpersonal aspect of human sexuality.
As Vatican Council II clearly affirms, “Man’s sexuality and the faculty of
generating life wondrously surpass the lower forms of life” (Gaudium et
spes, no. 51), and, as Pope John Paul II pointedly observes, human
fertility “is directed to the generation of a human being, and so by its nature
it surpasses the purely biological order and involves a whole series of
personal values” (Familiaris consortio, no. 11). The procreative meaning
of human sexuality, in this non-dualistic anthropology, is not subhuman
or subpersonal, in need of “being assumed” into the human. It is human
and personal to begin with.
The fundamental moral principle supporting recourse to the rhythm of the cycle
is not the “Caiaphas” or “preference” or “totality” principle we found
undergirding contraception. It is, rather, the commandment to love God above
all things and our neighbor as ourselves (see Deut 6:5, Lev 19:18; Matt 22:
37-39). And we love our neighbor only by loving the “goods” intrinsically
perfective of him: goods such life itself and health, knowledge of the truth,
appreciation of beauty, friendship etc. And we do not love our neighbor
if we are willing intentionally to deprive him of these goods, to impede
their flourishing in him, intentionally to destroy them. Thus,
as John Paul II rightly says,
reason
attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature
“incapable of being ordered” to God, because they radically contradict the good
of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church’s
moral tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum);
they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their
very object, and apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the
circumstances (Veritatis splendor, no. 80, 1).
The
concept of the human person as a body person, a unity of body and soul,
and the holistic, non-dualistic anthropology and love-centered,
non-consequentialistic understanding of the morality of human acts serving as
the bases for this concept underlie the practice of periodic abstinence or
“recourse to the rhythm of the cycle.” At the very heart of this
anthropology/morality is unconditional love of the body person, i.e. the
human person made in God’s image. It is for this reason that “recourse to
the rhythm of the cycle” is the “gateway” to the culture of life, just as its
opposite, contraception, is the “gateway” to the culture of death.
Endnotes
* This essay was published in the
journal, Faith, Vol. 31, No.4 (July-August, 2001) and is
posted here with permission.
[2] Similarly,
the Catechism of the Catholic Faith discusses contraception in its
treatment of the sixth commandment and of chastity in marriage (see nos.
2366-2370), whereas abortion is taken up in its treatment of the fifth
commandment (nos. 2270-2275).
[3]
Thus in his Homily at Mass for Youth in Nairobi, Kenya, August 17, 1985, he
pointed out that the fullest sign of self-giving is when couples willingly
accept children and declares: “That is why anti-life actions such as
contraception and abortion are wrong and unworthy of good husbands and wives.”
The text of this Homily is given in L’Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed.,
August 26, 1985, 5.
[4]
St. John Chrysostom, Homily 24 on the Epistle to the Romans, PG 60,
626-627. Translation in John T. Noonan, Contraception: A History of Its
Treatment by Catholic Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge, MA: The
Bellknap Press of Harvard University, 1965), p. 96. On pp. 91-94 Noonan shows
that contraception, along with abortion, was considered equivalent to murder in
early Christian writings.
[5]
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, 3, 122.
[6]
Text in Corpus iuris canonici, eds. A. L. Richter and A. Friedberg
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1881), 2, 794.
[7]
The Roman Catechism, Part II, Chap. 7, No. 13, in the translation of
Robert Bradley, S.J., and Eugene Kevane (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1985), p.
332.
[8]
John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses Called Genesis, Ch.
38: 9,10; quoted in Charles D. Provan, The Bible and Birth Control
(Monongahela, PA: Zimmer Printing, 1989), p. 15. Provan points out that the
editor of the alleged unabridged set of Calvin’s Commentaries,
published by Baker Book House, omitted from his text the commentary on these
two verses of Genesis.
[9]
See Germain Grisez, John Finnis,
Joseph Boyle, and William E. May, “‘ Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New
Life’: Toward a Clearer Understanding,” The Thomist 52.3 (1988) 365-426.
This essay was also published in Italian under the title, "'Ogni
atto coniugale deve essere aperto a uno nuova vita': verso una comprensione più
precisa," in Anthropotes: Rivista di Studi sulla Persona e la Famiglia
4.1 (May 1988) 73-122.
TOPIC
3 SEXUAL INTEGRITY
One of the greatest struggles for
Christians today is maintaining purity in a sex-saturated society. What began
in the late '60's as sexual liberation has now developed into open sexual
perversity. What was once confined to adult bookstores is now openly displayed
in every video store. Even well-respected hotels now provide R-rated and
X-rated movies for the enjoyment of their clients. Our teenagers face increased
pressure to join in sexual perversity. And the schools, instead of promoting
abstinence and chastity, actually encourage the use of contraceptives and help
students acquire them without parental consent. College students face increased
sexual pressure as well. When I was a student in 1968, coed dormitories were
introduced. Just eight years later, one of the students I worked with as
college pastor had to use coed bathrooms in his dorm
On certain issues I am still firmly
settled. There is no doubt in my mind that monogamous heterosexual relationships
represent God’s design for human sexuality. I firmly believe that homosexual
desire (like my own heterosexual inclination toward lust) arises from fallen
human nature and is not part of God’s will for human sexuality. This
seems to me the clear teaching of Scripture and also makes the most sense
emotionally, socially, and psychologically. We live in a fallen world and
should not be surprised to see evidence of this brokenness in ourselves and
those around us.
Some Points of AgreementI would like to start with several areas I think we can agree on. First, those involved in this forum agree on the authority and inspiration of Scripture. We believe that the Bible is God’s Word. There are two basic ways to approach the Bible. Some view the Bible as merely human reflections about God. From this perspective, the text is subjective, multivocal and fallible. It represents many voices communicating different and often contradictory messages about the nature of God, his purpose for the world and how human beings ought to live in relationship to God and to one another. It may be inspiring, but it is not divinely inspired. Those on this forum, however, consider the Bible to be God’s Word, a divine message from God to humanity. It is authoIritative and infallible, communicating God’s will, plan and purpose for his creation.
Second, however, we agree that the Bible is contextually given. God has revealed himself and his will through limited human agents in diverse cultural contexts and situations. Though God’s nature does not change, his purpose and intention for specific groups or individuals may differ depending on time and place. The most obvious example of this is the old covenant laws that were given to Israel. These commands were meant to regulate and order Israel’s civil and religious life in the Old Testament period and do not necessarily apply to the church. The Old Testament sacrificial system—though explicitly commanded in Scripture—was always intended to be temporary, pointing forward to its ultimate fulfillment in Christ’s sacrificial death on the cross.
Even new covenant commands are contextual and potentially limited in application. Most Christians today recognize that commands related to head coverings for women, greeting one another with a kiss, and washing feet as an act of service were given in specific cultural contexts and do not necessarily apply directly to the church today. The point is that biblical commands forbidding same-sex sexual relations are potentially within this category, applying only to certain historical contexts and situations and never intended to forbid faithful and monogamous same-sex sexual relationships.
This brings up what I believe is a third point of agreement. All participants in this discussion affirm that God’s design for human sexuality is for loving, faithful, self-sacrificial, monogamous sexual relationships. Though many within the gay rights movement (as well as the heterosexual community!) claim they have the right to complete sexual freedom and multiple sexual partners, this forum is about whether God ever blesses faithful, monogamous and lifelong same-sex unions.
The Hermeneutics of Cultural Analysis
If God’s commands are sometimes limited to specific persons, groups, times and places, how do we determine God’s will for us at any point in time? The answer is by establishing and consistently applying sound principles of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is the science and art of determining the original meaning of Scripture (through “exegesis”) and how it applies in diverse cultural and historical contexts (through “re-contextualization”). I have elsewhere suggested a variety of criteria for determining whether and how culturally-embedded commands apply to believers today (see my How to Read the Bible in Changing Times [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011], ch. 8). I would consider three of these to be most important and will briefly summarize them here.
(1) Criterion of Purpose: The purpose, or rationale, behind a command determines its application. We might say that the purpose of a command is more important than the command itself. For example, when Paul commands believers to greet one another with a kiss, his purpose is not to make sure that there is a lot of kissing in the church. It is to encourage believers to practice family affection. Whatever way a particular culture expresses family affection would be an appropriate fulfillment of this command.
With reference to our present topic, it will be essential to determine the purpose behind biblical commands related to same-sex relationships. Are the purposes for these commands related to sexual purity per se, or to something else, such as exploitation, abuse, inhospitality, ritual impurity, etc.?
(2) Criterion of Cultural Correspondence: The closer the cultural or historical context to our own, the more likely we should apply the command directly. Many commands in Scripture are related to cultural practices that have direct parallels today. For example, Paul’s command to avoid drunkenness (Eph. 5:18) has direct relevance today. Alcohol abuse causes the same kinds of personal, social and societal problems today that it did in the first century. Other commands, like head covering on women, may not have the same cultural significance today that they did in the first century world.
One of the major questions of debate around our topic is whether the homosexual acts condemned in the Old Testament and in Paul’s writings are analogous to same-sex relationships being advocated by some Christians today.
(3) Criterion of Canonical Consistency: Ethical imperatives that remain consistent throughout the Bible are more likely to reflect God’s universal purpose and will. This criterion relates especially to fundamentally moral commands, which relate to more or less absolute standards of right and wrong. Commands such as those against murder, stealing, lying, cheating, coveting, adultery, exploitation of the poor, and idolatry remain consistent throughout the Old and New Testaments and so are almost certainly God’s will for all time.
Conversely, biblical commands that vary significantly across time and space are not necessarily binding. This criterion can be helpfully applied to various controversial areas that many see as parallel to the same-sex debate, such as the role of women and men and the issue of slavery. It is certainly true that Scripture allows practices like slavery, polygamy, and the subordination of women when they were part of the social fabric of the biblical world. I often tell my students that we do not necessarily have an absolute ethic in Scripture on many issues. God is working in and through fallen human cultures and sometimes allows less-than-ideal institutions to govern life in certain cultural situations.
While many passages in the Bible affirm a patriarchal system and call for male leadership and female submission (Eph. 5:22; Col. 3:18; 1 Pet. 3:1; 1 Tim. 2:11–15), there are many others that affirm the equality of women as divine image bearers (Gen. 1:27; Gal. 3:28) and depict women in various leadership roles (Miriam [Exod. 15:20]; Huldah [2 Kings 22:14]; Deborah [Judg. 4–5]; Priscilla [Acts 18:26]; Phoebe [Rom. 16:1]; Junia [Rom. 16:7]; Euodia and Syntyche [Phil. 4:2–3]). While all these passages are debated as to their significance, it is hard to argue for complete canonical consistency on this issue.
Similarly, although the Bible allows slavery (or indentured servitude) in various cultural contexts (Lev. 25:44–45; Eph. 6:5–6; Col. 3:22; Titus 2:9; 1 Pet. 2:18), there are many indications that slavery is not God’s ideal for human relationships (Gen. 1:26–27; 1 Cor. 7:22; Eph. 6:8; Col. 3:24; Philem. 15–17). Consider, for example, the Exodus deliverance as the OT paradigm of God’s salvation and the eschatological promise of freedom for those in bondage (Isa. 61:1–2).
By contrast, whenever same-sex sexual acts are mentioned in Scripture, they are consistently and univocally forbidden. There is never a hint that these acts are part of God’s design for human sexuality. God surely knew that this issue would become controversial in the church of the twenty-first century. Yet I have found it impossible to read Scripture in any normal or straightforward manner and reach the conclusion that, contrary to all appearances, God blesses such unions. To be sure, Scripture is not always simple or easy. But what puzzles and confounds me is that, if God in fact intended us to understand Scripture in this way, he could hardly have chosen a more confusing and contradictory way of communicating this.
This argument can be extended throughout church history. For three millennia the people of God have understood Scripture to teach that same-sex sexual activity is outside God’s will for human sexuality. Are we really to believe that even the most Godly and sensitive of believers have for millennia radically misunderstood and misapplied the Spirit’s voice on this issue and are only now coming to the light? Isn’t it more likely that today—as throughout history—sinful human culture is placing pressure on the people of God to compromise God’s standards of righteousness? There are many Godly believers throughout history who have affirmed the value and dignity of women as divine image bearers and who have viewed slavery as an evil and fallen human institution. Yet there is no such historical precedent for those affirming same-sex unions.
Some Key Biblical Texts
Genesis 1-2. Genesis 2 establishes monogamous heterosexual relationships as the pre-Fall standard for human sexuality. While up to this point in the Genesis narrative all of creation is identified as “good,” here we learn that, “It is not good for the man to be alone.” So from the man’s own body God creates a “helper suitable for him” (Gen. 2:18). Eve is brought to Adam and the narrator announces the establishment of the marriage relationship: “That is why a man leaves his father and mother and is united to his wife, and they become one flesh” (Gen. 2:24). The union is between one man (ʾı̂š) and one woman (ʾiššā).
Advocates of same-sex relationships often claim that this text is not speaking about gender complementarity but about companionship, which can be equally fulfilled in a same-sex relationship. While no doubt companionship is a key component here, in the near context both procreation and gender complementarity are also emphasized. In the first (summary) creation account in Genesis 1, God creates humanity in his own image as male (zāḵār) and female (nᵉqēḇāh) and commands them to procreate: “Be fruitful and increase in number, fill the earth and subdue it” (1:27–28). God could not have told marriage partners to procreate if he had in mind same-sex partners.
Similarly, gender complementary is emphasized in chapter two. Eve is created as “a helper suitable for him” (2:18 NIV). The rare Hebrew word kᵉneg̱dô, translated variously as “suitable for him” (NIV), “who is right for him” (God’s Word), “who corresponds to him” (NET), “as his complement” (HCSB), could be more formally rendered as “like opposite him.” In context it clearly carries the sense of both similarity and difference. Eve is like Adam and distinct from the animals because she was created from him. She is “bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh” (2:23). Yet she is also different from him and is his perfect complement. He is man (ʾı̂š); she is woman (ʾiššā). He is male (zāḵār); she is female (nᵉqēḇāh). She was created from his side to be at his side as his equal and partner. In the marriage relationship, the two complement each other and together become “one flesh” (2:24). This binary complementarity and suitability is most clearly evident in the sexual union (male and female body parts fit together) but also likely refers to complementary emotional, psychological and social traits. Though it is true that male and female gender qualities and stereotypes vary somewhat across cultures and between individuals within a particular culture, it is hard to deny that men and women are indeed different—and wonderfully complementary.
As the foundational creation account, these passages establish God’s purpose and parameters for human sexuality. God meets Adam’s need of companionship by creating a woman. The result is a monogamous heterosexual marriage relationship. The foundational and paradigmatic nature of this text suggests that it represents God’s design for human sexuality. By implication, any form of sexual behavior outside of this relationship—whether premarital, extramarital or homosexual—is beyond the bounds of God’s design. Jesus, of course, cites these passages when discussing the fundamental nature of the marriage relationship (Matt. 19:3-12//Mark 10:2-12).
While indicative of God’s ideal, the Genesis account alone would be insufficient to rule out same-sex sexual acts as sinful. Yet such behavior is explicitly forbidden elsewhere in both the OT and the NT.
Leviticus 18:22; 20:13. The most explicit commands against homosexual behavior in the OT come in the holiness code of Leviticus. Leviticus 18:22 reads, “Do not have sexual relations with a man as one does with a woman; that is detestable” (NIV). Leviticus 20:13 identifies the penalty for such actions as death.
Some claim that these commands relate merely to purity issues rather than to overtly sinful behavior. But the imposition of the death penalty shows that this is far more significant than a purity issue. Purity issues are resolved through the passage of time, ritual washing or offering sacrifices, not through capital punishment. The death penalty is reserved for serious violations of God’s character, his created order, and the covenant between Yahweh and his people. Similar punishments apply to sins like adultery, incest, and cursing one’s parents. Our point, of course, is not that Christians should advocate for capital punishment for any of these sins (these are old covenant punishments related to Israel), but only that they are clearly in a different category than purity concerns.
Others argue that these passages concern not sexual relationships per se, but cultic prostitution, thus violating God’s commands to be separate from the nations. But there is nothing in the context to indicate this. The surrounding laws govern sexual matters generally, not cultic prostitution. The language associated with cultic prostitution used elsewhere does not occur here (cf. Deut. 23:17-18).
Further evidence that these Levitical commands are inherently moral comes from two references to homosexual behavior in the letters of Paul, 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 and 1 Timothy 1:9-10. Both are in lists or catalogs of sins common in the pagan world. Some argue that Paul is not here referring to homosexual behavior per se, but rather to pederasty, slave prostitution or other form of exploitation. Yet the primary term Paul uses in both passages (arsenokoitai) is a compound word combining “male” (arsēn) and “bed” (koitē), a euphemism for male with male sexual activity. Since 1 Corinthians 6:9 is the first appearance of arsenokoitēs in Greek literature, it seems likely that Paul coined the term in intentional imitation of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13, where the Greek translation (the Septuagint) uses these same two terms. “With a male [arsēn] do not lie on a bed [koitē] as with a woman; for that is an abomination” (Lev. 18:22; authors’ translation; cf. 20:13). If this is the case, Paul takes the general Levitical prohibition and applies it in a new covenant context.
Romans 1:26-27. Romans 1:18-32 is the beginning of Paul’s argument that all human beings are sinful and fallen, deserving God’s condemnation. Although God has revealed himself in creation, human beings have suppressed this knowledge. “They exchanged the truth about God for a lie, and worshiped and served created things rather than the Creator...” (1:25). As a result “God gave them over to shameful lusts” (1:26a), illustrated with reference to homosexual behavior:
Even their women exchanged natural sexual relations for unnatural ones. In the same way the men also abandoned natural relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men committed shameful acts with other men, and received in themselves the due penalty for their error. (1:26b-27 NIV).
Paul here identifies homosexual behavior (females with females; males with males) as “unnatural” (para physin), an example of the distortion that results from humanity’s rejection of God. Paul probably singles out same-sex behavior not because it is unique or a greater sin than others, but because it is perceived by most people (i.e. heterosexuals) as unnatural, contrary to their own sexual desires. Having made this point, Paul subsequently lists many other sins that result from our fallen state, including envy, murder, strife, deceit, malice, gossip, slander, God-hating, insolence, arrogance, etc. (1:29-31).
TPOIC
ONE ON WIDOW
INTRODUCTION
By God's design, a wife is to be the
special object of her husband's love and care. As "a weaker vessel" (1 Pet. 3:7), she is under his authority and protection. But if a woman
loses her husband, she is often left without any means of financial support.
Such women are under God's special care. The psalmist said the Lord is "a
defender of widows" (Ps. 68:5, NIV; cf. Deut. 10:18). God's compassion goes out to them because of their
difficult situation. And Scripture reveals that has always been God's attitude
toward widows.
A. Old
Testament Teaching
3. Jeremiah 22:3-4--"Do no violence to the ... widow.... For if ye do
this thing indeed, then shall there enter in by the gates of this house kings
sitting upon the throne of David ... he, and his servants, and his
people."
4. Exodus 22:22-23--"Ye shall not afflict any widow.... If thou afflict
them in any way, and they cry at all unto me, I will surely hear their
cry." So God blessed those who cared for widows but cursed those who
didn't.
The Old Testament also taught that
remarriage was the ideal for a widow. Where remarriage was not possible, a
widow could stay either in the house of her parents (cf. Gen. 38:11) or in-laws (cf. Ruth 1:16). And according to Levirate marriage (Deut. 25:5-6), the brother of the deceased husband could marry her. If
he refused, the next male-of-kin was free to do so. Boaz married Ruth in that
manner (Ruth 4:1-10) .
B. New
Testament Teaching
1.The example of Christ
a) In the Temple
Jesus Christ exemplified the perfect
attitude toward widows. Mark 12 tells us He Jesus sat opposite the Temple
treasury as worshipers gave their money offerings. He noticed that the wealthy
gave large amounts of money but a widow gave only a small amount. Jesus said to
His disciples, "This poor widow hath cast more in than all they who have
cast into the treasury; for all they did cast in of their abundance, but she of
her want did cast in all that she had, even all her living" (vv. 43-44).
Christ commended the widow's worship. Her generous spirit was evidence she had
a sincere and godly heart.
b) In a widow's home
As Jesus approached the city of
Nain, "there was a dead man carried out, the only son of his mother, and
she was a widow, and many people of the city were with her" (Luke 7:12). Because of her son's death, no one was left to care for
her. When the Lord saw her, He "had compassion on her, and said unto her,
Weep not. And he came and touched the bier; and they that bore him sat still.
And he said, Young man, I say unto thee, Arise. And he that was dead sat up,
and began to speak. And he delivered him to his mother" (vv. 13-15). Jesus
was so touched by the widow's plight that He raised her son from the dead so he
could continue to care for her.
c) On the cross
John 19 tells us that when Jesus,
hanging on the cross, "saw his mother, and the disciple standing by, whom
he loved, he saith unto his mother, Woman, behold thy son! Then saith he to the
disciple, Behold thy mother! And from that hour that disciple took her unto his
own home" (vv. 26-27). Jesus deeply cared about Mary so He entrusted her
to the apostle John's care.
2. The example of the early church
a) The church at Jerusalem
Because of its rapid numerical
growth "there arose a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrews,
because their widows were neglected in the daily ministration" (Acts 6:1). "Hebrews" refers to Jewish people living in
Palestine while "Grecians" (also called Hellenists) refers to
Jewish people who had been dispersed or scattered outside of Palestine.
Hellenists came to Jerusalem for holidays, and some even moved to Palestine to
live. Perhaps those referred to in Acts 6 were residents of the city, or stayed
in homes with other Christian families, or were housed at various inns.
Apparently the Hellenistic widows in
the church did not receive the same care as those from Palestine. Perhaps that
was because the Hellenistic people were not a part of the original Jewish
community. Whatever the reason, the apostles gathered the believers together
and asked them to find "seven men of honest report, full of the Holy
Spirit and wisdom" to care for the Hellenistic widows (v. 3). Honesty was
necessary since they would be handling money and food; wisdom and the Spirit's
control were necessary to evaluate each widow's need with sensitivity. The plan
pleased the Hellenistic believers and seven such men were chosen.
b) Peter at Joppa
In the city of Joppa lived a kind
and gracious believer named Tabitha (also called Dorcas), but she became sick
and died (Acts 9:36-37). Normally it was not the Jewish custom to embalm the body
but only to wash it for a time of viewing or mourning (v. 37).
The believers in Joppa heard that
Peter was in the nearby city of Lydda, so they sent for him, obviously knowing
he had demonstrated the power of God through many previous miracles. Perhaps
they hoped he could do something for Tabitha as well. So Peter journeyed there
and came to the room where she lay. "All the widows stood by him weeping,
and showing the coats and garments which Dorcas had made, while she was with
them" (v. 39). Dorcas had apparently used her own resources to make
clothing for a number of destitute widows.
Then Peter asked everyone in the
room to leave, "kneeled down, and prayed; and turning to the body said,
Tabitha, arise. And she opened her eyes; and when she saw Peter, she sat
up" (v. 40). There was probably confusion along with the weeping. Peter
was considerate in having them leave the room rather than trying to stop their
crying. He probably wanted to be alone to pray as well. It was the second
resurrection recorded in the New Testament that benefited widows, the first
being the resurrection of the widow's son in Nain. The brokenhearted widows of
Joppa were comforted because the woman so dear to them had been raised from the
dead.
The book of James summarizes God's
compassion for widows: "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the
Father is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to
keep oneself unspotted from the world" (1:27). A believer demonstrates his
faith by deeds of love and mercy to those in need.
Paul wanted the church to
demonstrate its faith that way. His lengthy section on widows (1 Tim. 5:3-16) shows the importance of the subject. In that
section, he gave several principles to govern the church's conduct toward
widows.
LESSON
I. THE CHURCH'S
OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT WIDOWS (v. 3)
"Honor widows that are widows
indeed."
A. Defining
Widows
The Greek term translated
"widow" (chera) means "bereft" and conveys a sense of
suffering loss or being left alone. The term does not tell us how a woman
became a widow and therefore the cause is not limited to a husband's death.
"Widows indeed" is qualified by the Greek term translated
"desolate" (ontos; v. 5), which means "having been left
alone." It indicates that no one is able to help her.
In ancient times, widows were in an
especially difficult position because honorable employment for women was not
readily available, neither were there any secular institutions to provide for
them. Perhaps some could receive help through family or friends, but many lived
in poverty, never having received an inheritance. Since the outlook for many
was bleak, it was vital for the church to assist them. In fact, as we saw in James 1:27, the treatment of widows was a test whereby believers demonstrated
the genuineness of their faith.
B. Honoring
Widows
Christian widows left alone are to
receive "honor" (Gk., timao, "to revere" or
"value"), if they meet the qualifications that Paul later mentions.
Matthew 15 illustrates that honor
includes financial support. The scribes and Pharisees confronted Jesus, saying,
"Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders?" (v.
2). The "tradition of the elders" was a large compilation of rules
and regulations imposed upon the Jewish people's way of life. It developed from
interpretations of Scripture by various Jewish religious leaders but often
added to or even contradicted Scripture.
The scribes and Pharisees said
Christ's disciples violated their tradition because they "wash not their
hands when they eat bread" (v. 2). That washing had nothing to do with
sanitation but was directly related to a religious, ceremonial cleansing.
Since the disciples didn't recognize
the tradition as scriptural, they simply ignored it. And Jesus responded by
saying, "Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God by your
tradition? For God commanded, saying, Honor thy father and mother; and, He that
curseth father or mother, let him die the death. But ye say, Whosoever shall
say to his father or his mother, It is a gift, by whatsoever thou mightest be
profited by me; and honor not his father or mother, he shall be free. Thus have
ye made the commandment of God of no effect by your tradition" (vv. 3-6).
His explanation included a reference to the Ten Commandments about honoring
your parents (Ex. 20:12). The Jewish people in the days of Moses understood that to
include financial support.
But the tradition that developed
contradicted the intent of that commandment. It allowed a person to pledge
money to God by saying, "It is a gift." The money could then only be
given to the Lord. So if a person didn't want to give money to his needy
parents, he would simply pledge it to the Lord. If he later decided to keep the
money for personal use instead, tradition also allowed him to rescind his
original vow. So it served neither God nor family but only selfish interests.
C. Supporting
Widows
Widows receiving honor are qualified
as "widows indeed." The Greek term (ontos) translated
"indeed" means "in reality" or "in point of
fact." The fact is they are alone and therefore in need of financial
support. So "widows indeed" are to be distinguished from widows
having financial means. Some husbands may have left their wives with wonderful
resources such as a home and some money. In those instances, the church should
still be there to provide for any spiritual needs.
We live in a country that provides
some basic coverage for widows. But the scope of their needs is increasing.
Some widows might desire a Christian education for their children, and the
church could set up a scholarship fund toward meeting that need. Other widows
may have previously lived on a low income while others may have lived on a
higher one. So the church will need to exercise wisdom to determine which needs
are real ones.
The church must be committed to
widows who genuinely need assistance, whatever the cost might be. It may mean
transferring money out of optional church programs so basic needs can be met.
The church should be happy to do that because it shows God's compassion toward
the destitute. Even when widows have financial resources, the church needs to
come alongside with encouragement, love, and support in every way possible.
The increasing collapse of the
family unit in our society means there will be an increase in the number of
widows that need to be under the church's care. For instance, a Christian widow
with several children might not receive any help from unsaved parents. It would
be good if she could move back into her parent's home (Gen. 38:11) but that is not always possible.
II. THE
CHURCH'S OBLIGATION TO EVALUATE THEIR NEEDS (vv. 4-8)
The church needs to discern which
widows are in genuine need of financial care. It cannot indiscriminately give
to everyone. So Scripture lays down some guidelines to determine who qualifies
and who doesn't.
A. Widows with
Families (v. 4)
"If any widow have children or
nephews, let them learn first to show piety at home, and to requite their
parents; for that is good and acceptable before God."
The Greek term translated
"nephews" (ekgonos) means "descendants" or
"grandchildren." Many widows have children and grandchildren. The
Greek term translated "home" (oikos) refers to the family.
"First" indicates a priority of order. Family members are the first
ones responsible to care for widows. The first place for children and
grandchildren to demonstrate their godliness is in the context of family
living, which includes making sure each family member is provided for. In fact,
verse 8 says, "If any provide not for his own, and specially for those of
his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an [unbeliever]."
True spirituality reveals itself in
the context of family relationships. Paul previously emphasized that in chapter
3, where he said an elder must manage his own household well (v. 4), and a
deacon must exercise good oversight over his family (v. 12). The burden isn't
only on the older family members: godly young people will desire good
relationships with their family members as well. Relating well to each other is
an indication of a godly family. Perhaps even an application of enrollment for
a seminary student could include a letter of reference from the parents. It
might ask, What evidences of godliness have seen in your child's life?
Family members are not only to show
godliness at home but also "to requite" (Gk., amoibe,
"recompense") their parents. Children are to give back a return
to their parents, which includes a financial obligation. Besides providing
material items such as food, clothing, and housing, parents also give
intangible assets such as love and encouragement. It should be a great and
happy privilege for children to return a small measure of the tremendous
support they have received from their parents.
Conclusion
A widow in the biblical sense may be
a daughter, a mother, a sister, a niece, or an aunt who loses her husband
through divorce, desertion, imprisonment, or especially death. Caring for such
a woman is a privilege and a manifestation of God's compassion. Paul said doing
so "is good and acceptable before God" (v. 4). Parents deserve our
respect and support, especially those who are widows.
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